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interdisciplinary research on important topics of either leadership or sustainability, as well as providing 
background for teaching. They provide a means for more extensive and contextual discussion of 
topics than is typically possible within journals of specific academic disciplines. Feedback on these 
papers helps inform further research, ahead of submissions to journals or books. Previous Occasional 
Papers are available via the website.  
Abstract 
Background: The existence of a Monetary Growth Imperative (MGI) and its implications for 
economic stability, democracy and environmental sustainability have been put forward by 
environmental economists for around two decades but recently criticised as invalid. Given the 
urgency of the climate and ecological crisis alongside spiralling public and private debt, the 
MGI deserves closer attention.  
Methods: For this review paper we analysed studies on the MGI, using a selective, iterative 
approach to the literature review. 
Results: Our critical review of the research on the MGI revealed several full academic 
treatments of the argument and even a taxonomy of them, most of which have not been 
refuted. We articulate one of them in a new way, as well as two more which have not received 
academic treatment, before considering why it might be thought politically expedient that any 
MGI should be refuted, or at least seen to be refuted. 
Conclusion: In any economy where money hoarding and accumulation is not curtailed, and 
where most of the money in circulation is issued by private banks as debt, with or without 
interest, there will be a system-wide scarcity of money available to people and organisations 
to service their debts – unless, that is, there is continual economic growth. To avoid the 
deleterious implications of a shortfall of money in an economy, policies are used to maintain 
economic growth, which is therefore a form of imperative on society. This MGI may be 
accentuated, at a system-wide level, by the practice of full-reserve re-lending of money. 
Interest is not the main driver of the imperative, but because it increases the transfer of money 
to those who are wealthy and more likely to hold that money in a stagnant form that is not 
available for debt servicing by others, interest charges may indeed exacerbate the MGI. We 
conclude that the debt-money system creates a competition for money between debtors and 
savers which is resolved through creation of more debt-money, which in turn drives growth 




COVID-19 reflects a broader trend: more planetary crises are coming. If we muddle 
through each new crisis while maintaining the same economic model that got us here, 
future shocks will eventually exceed the capacity of governments, financial institutions, 
and corporate crisis managers to respond. Indeed, the ‘coronacrisis’ has already done 
so. (Kellerhof 2020) 
 
As climate change becomes more frightening and combines with environmental degradation 
to make even coronavirus disease outbreaks more likely (Tolefson 2020), people are 
increasingly questioning the future of modern capitalism – even in the halls of power (World 
Economic Forum 2020). As part of this questioning, a number of activists since the late 20th 
and early 21st century have focused on the monetary system. Like each of us three authors, 
most of them initially accepted and repeated a simple argument pervading the literature on 
money and sustainability: because of the logic of compound interest, it was claimed, money 
created as bank debt constituted a structural growth imperative, because there could never 
be enough debt-money in circulation to pay both the principal and the interest. There was, in 
other words, an interest-debt-driven 'Monetary Growth Imperative' (MGI).1 
 
Then, after more than a decade, word spread throughout the activist as well as the academic 
sphere that this notion of interest-driven MGI had been debunked. Apparently bank debt 
money was not, as so many of us had long believed, an obstacle to addressing the ecological 
crisis and, in fact, the existence of an MGI itself was not important for understanding why the 
capitalist economy generates environmental degradation.  
 
As both practitioners and scholars, we were intrigued and needed to take a closer look. Was 
it really the case that there was no intrinsic need to look at monetary mechanisms when 
seeking to adapt to planetary emergency? Upon closer inspection, we learned that there were 
in fact several different proposed mechanisms for an MGI, each leading down its own rabbit 
hole of intellectual pathways. Our endeavour to gain a clearer view of the MGI landscape took 
us on a journey of discovery and led to the theoretical and epistemological findings presented 
in this paper. Given the importance and complexity of this topic, we are sharing our findings 
in the form of an Occasional Paper of significant length, and invite feedback and collaboration 
for specific parts of our arguments to be the basis for journal submissions. Therefore, in 
addition to releasing this as a PDF download from the University of Cumbria, a live version of 
this document is available for comment at this link.  
Brief overview of the argument 
The experience of a different way of life during lockdowns has increased the degree of 
attention to the field of 'degrowth', as evidenced by the recent popularity of books like Less is 
More (Hickel 2020) and Doughnut Economics (Raworth 2017). Meanwhile, governments have 
responded to the 2007/8 financial crisis and its aftermath by accelerating the rate at which 
they take on new debt. Our understanding is that these two trends are incompatible and that 
without structural changes to monetary systems, degrowth – or a steady-state economy – will 
be impossible. This is the inevitable result of the wealthy hoarding other people's debt (in the 
form of initially bank-created money that then gets pulled out of circulation) so that debtors, 
rather than repaying, are forced to borrow more. Our paper aims to explain this argument in 
detail and to encourage engagement with the necessary policy options to pursue a different 
path. We want to argue that any variant of capitalism that might theoretically be compatible 
 
1  The term MGI comes from the post-Keynesian school (see section 4 below) which postulates that money 
is, by nature, debt. 
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with steady-state, growth-agnostic, or degrowth policy objectives would need to not rely on 
bank issuance of debt-money as its prime means of exchange. 
 
Degrowth economics stems in part from an environmental critique of how the constant 
expansion of economic activity, measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – which is 
tightly coupled to material throughput – has surged beyond planetary limits, as measured, for 
example, by the continuously regenerated availability of raw materials or the capacity of 
natural sinks to safely absorb industrial waste. Economic activity must decline because it is 
strongly correlated with energy use, carbon emissions and resource depletion, and it would 
be better if that decline were managed through policy (Kallis et al. 2020). 
 
Some people contributing to the degrowth field assert that because money is created as debt, 
an MGI is inevitable and, consequently, the way almost all of the world's money is created 
must change to become compatible with a steady-state or degrowth economy (Bendell and 
Greco 2013; Trainer 2012: 592). Others have sought to demonstrate that ushering in a steady-
state economy is possible even if most of the existing money system is left intact (Jackson 
and Victor 2015; Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie 2016). In recent years, it appears this latter view 
has either gained sufficient agreement, or sown sufficient doubt in the former view, for issues 
of monetary reform to slip down the degrowth agenda (McNeill Douglas 2019). Unfortunately, 
these conclusions taken at face value are compromising the work of the degrowth movement 
and of related strands of environmental and social justice activism. Furthermore, in light of the 
private- and public-debt implications of policy responses to Covid-19, it is increasingly 
essential for the MGI to be properly understood, and hence recognized as real, by advocates 
of sovereignty and democracy. To help with these crucial tasks, we will demonstrate two things 
in this paper: first, the established presentations of the MGI that lead to its being rejected or 
denied are actually flawed; and second, there is a correct version of the MGI that withstands 
rejection and even remains visible in the models of the very economists who deny the 
existence of an MGI. 
 
From our past decades of reading, research, activism and professional engagement in 
initiatives seeking to develop economic alternatives to mainstream globalising neoliberal 
capitalism, we identified the monetary system as key to how societies function and change 
(Lietaer et al. 2012; Bendell and Greco 2013; Bendell and Slater 2017). Steady-state 
economics and degrowth economics are two fields that bring together scholars, activists, 
innovators and policy advisors who are interested in systemic economic change in order to 
address multiple social and environmental dilemmas (Kallis et al. 2020). In these fields, as we 
will see, the MGI has become widely contested and subsequently deprioritized, and this has 
important – and, to us, detrimental – implications for activism as well as for policy proposals. 
Methodology and structure 
This is an atypical review paper. We did not aim to comprehensively review all the literature 
published in one or all fields of scholarship that deal with the topic of an MGI. Instead, we 
sought to identify the literature that was most salient for our inquiry into whether an MGI exists 
or not. Therefore, we used databases, bibliographies of relevant works, and expert advice in 
order to identify literature that is well referenced as either establishing or debunking an MGI. 
As that reading identified new issues or caveats, we then looked specifically for research on 
these new items.  
 
Our first step was to identify the kinds of arguments used by people who either propose or 
critique any form of MGI. We sought to understand the way they define the MGI, with attention 
to any assumptions that might arise due to the conceptual frameworks of their discipline and/or 
particular school of thought within economics. In that process we were particularly interested 
in work that offered a full technical treatment of the issue, rather than the numerous 
discussions offering only brief descriptions and making them sound self-evident. Second, we 
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focused in particular on the work of a few economists whose research has had a particular 
influence within the degrowth area, both among scholars and activists. Our aim was not to 
criticise their intention or their wider contributions to the field, but to convey our findings 
concerning the way in which their framing of the MGI hypothesis appeared to have been 
problematic and, we found, unhelpful to radical economic policy initiative and activism. 
 
When analysing their work, our intellectual framework was influenced by critical social theory, 
which considers how unacknowledged ideology operates within all of us by shaping the 
assumptions we make about the meaning of concepts, and how our aversions or attractions 
to certain framings or findings arise from a sense of how they might align with incumbent 
power (Arnsperger 2008, 2010b; Bendell et al. 2017). Critical social theory is also informed by 
research that shows how scholars that are trained and work within establishment institutions 
are typically less critical of power in their questions, analysis and findings than the general 
public (Schmidt 2001). The result is that, whereas our discussion of relevant literature is not 
quite comprehensive, it hopefully helps move forward understanding of the MGI as well as the 
likely reasons why this topic has been widely misunderstood over the past decade. Although 
a more systematic and comprehensive literature review might add to this field of scholarship 
in future, this is not the purpose or intended contribution of the present paper. 
 
The first section sets out the crucial context within which we are analysing the existence and 
reality of an MGI – namely, the steady increase in both public and private debt in virtually all 
countries of the globe. In section 2, we explain what a growth imperative is, and give examples. 
Next, section 3 looks at the original formulations of the MGI and finds them mostly inadequate, 
after which it proceeds to describe the most celebrated (post-Keynesian) refutation of the MGI. 
In section 4, we lay out the mechanisms we still find convincing, and we then explain in detail 
why the MGI is virtually impossible to eliminate from a capitalist debt-money system. Section 
5 sets out how the ideological frameworks of some economists and their assumptions about 
capitalism, combined with a wish to reassure capitalist interests, may have meant that they 
sought to reject the MGI hypothesis rather than refine it. We recognise that this may be a 
controversial conclusion for some, who might also question the relevance of our analysis of 
the subjectivities of scholars as revealed in their texts. Accordingly, in section 6, we explain 
why critical transdisciplinarity should now replace more traditional assumptions about 
researcher objectivity, which are nowadays widely regarded as intellectually flawed and 
protective of privilege and power. We offer some conclusions for any scholar seeking to be 
relevant to a rapidly changing world where societies and knowledge systems are under stress. 
In the penultimate section 7, we put this topic into the context of increasing threats of societal 
disruption, breakdown and collapse, before finally, in section 8, offering an array of policy 
suggestions at local, national and international levels aimed at de-activating the MGI. While 
economists may spot that our style of communication, use of terms and analysis of the 
institutional contexts shaping researchers’ approaches are not typical for economics, we invite 
them to focus instead on the potential insights coming from an economic anthropologist, a 
sociologist and an activist together attempting an assessment of the field of monetary 
economics. 
 
1. The context of generalized and increasing indebtedness 
A crucial context for our analysis is the threat to democracy, social wellbeing and 
environmental action that arises from both private and public indebtedness.  
 
Total global sovereign debt rose from $33tn to $38tn in the immediate wake of the 2007/8 
financial crisis; due to bailouts, interest charges, and the difficulties of repayment in an 
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economic slump, it had already snowballed to $57tn by 2015.2 These public debts, and the 
decline in tax revenues due to an economic slump, meant that an era of ‘austerity’ was 
introduced to many countries around the world. This has meant the privatisation of state-
owned assets, as well as cuts to public spending on basic services and regulatory functions 
(Cahill and Saad-Filho 2017). These policies have had serious human consequences, 
increasing ill health and mortality in many countries (Tepe-Belfrage and Wallin 2016). They 
are also assessed by some as having had a negative impact on environmental protections 
and initiatives in certain parts of the world (Onyango et al. 2020). If we fast-forward to 2020, 
the IMF estimates that 'fiscal measures' during the pandemic alone will amount to an additional 
$11.7tn in government debt (IMF 2020). 
 
Given the magnitude of the new debts, the failure of post-2008 austerity to reduce past ones, 
and the mounting physical and political constraints on growth, one might ask how the new 
debts will be serviced. Some hope that governments endowed with monetary sovereignty 
could perhaps usefully spend new money into existence using the principles of Modern 
Monetary Theory (Kelton 2020), but this new paradigm is still far from being firmly entrenched 
and offers little respite for countries or regions (such as individual EU countries and many 
developing countries) that have no monetary sovereignty. Therefore, without fundamental 
monetary reform, much of the world is likely to follow Greece down the path of increasing 
privatisation of roads, police, military, ports, state broadcasters, and much of the remaining 
civil services, with all the dire consequences this entails (Fouskas and Dimoulas 2017). If we 
are to even begin addressing these sorts of dangers, one crucial condition is that the possibility 
of an MGI be reinstated, because the progressive fields of policy discussion and activism in 
areas like degrowth may have been unhelpfully confused in this area by economists who, 
while presenting themselves as critics of growth, are shying away from the anti- and post-
capitalist implications of recognizing an MGI. 
 
Although there will undoubtedly be efforts to 'return to growth', this growth will be constrained 
by diminishing resources and will accelerate the climate crisis. Prior to the 2020 pandemic, 
humanity had already been unable to reverse or even collectively slow the growth in carbon 
emissions, despite clear knowledge of the risks (Bendell 2018). There was a decline in carbon 
emissions in 2020 due to Covid-19, but it was not sustained as countries exited lockdowns 
(Harvey 2020). While many governments committed funds for green investments, they also 
put a lot of public funds into saving polluting industries and restarting consumption (Andrijevic 
et al. 2020; Allam 2020). Recent research from climatologists suggests that global warming of 
over 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels this decade is likely, and 2 degrees not long after 
(Huntingford et al. 2020). These are somewhat arbitrary levels rather than precise boundaries, 
chosen by scientists to indicate that warming above such levels produces increasingly 
catastrophic impacts on nature and human societies. Unfortunately, our financial system is 
driving us even further over the edge. According to the Bank of England, the financial firms in 
the City of London are complicit in setting us on the path to more than 3.5 degrees of warming 
above pre-industrial levels (Carney 2019).  
 
This is all the more problematic because the trend of private indebtedness – the reliance of 
both households and businesses on credit – has also been rising sharply in most countries. In 
particular in the US, structurally high and growing mortgage and consumer debt (which lay at 
the root of the 2007/8 crisis) is considered to be the main ‘engine’ of economic growth, as the 
country’s twin fiscal and trade/payment deficits are exerting a significant drag on the domestic 
economy (Varoufakis 2011). Recent data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD 2020a) show that US household debt (primarily mortgages and 
consumer loans) is around 100% of net disposable income for 2018, with even larger 
percentages, for instance, for the UK (148% in 2019) and for Switzerland (223% in 2018). At 
 
2  https://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock  
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the same time, households’ average savings as a proportion of their disposable income tend 
to be quite low (in the UK, down to almost 0% in 2018/9 from 7% in 2009), while households’ 
total financial assets per capita tend to go from moderate to rather large: in 2016 figures, US$ 
240,000 for the US, US$ 143,000 in the UK and US$ 242,500 for Switzerland. 
 
Given the rising trend in domestic economic inequality in the US and the UK, as well as in 
numerous other parts of the world (see, for example, Dorling 2014; Milanovic 2018, 2019), this 
strongly suggests a phenomenon we will be focusing on in section 5 – namely, the majority of 
households have low assets (if any at all) and low savings (if any at all) while being strongly 
indebted, while a small minority of wealthy households have both huge assets and huge 
savings while carrying no debt but, on the contrary, having very large positive net worth.  
 
In parallel, the corporate debts of non-financial firms suggest structural over-indebtedness that 
can only, it seems, be sustained through constantly rolled-over loans, with new loans serving 
to cover existing interest, but also a significant part of outstanding principal. Indeed, according 
to the OECD (2020b), if we look at the debt-to-surplus ratio – which provides “an indication of 
the capacity of non-financial corporations to meet the cost of interest and debt repayments 
with the operational profits generated” – we see that profits have been significantly leveraged 
into debts, yielding ratios (for the year 2015) that range from 3.1 in Germany to 6.1 in the UK 
and 7.7 in the US.    
 
In a majority of countries, therefore, private debts are structurally high and rising, and they 
drive growth – because public deficits left to themselves prompt either recession (in the US) 
or austerity (in much of the rest of the world) – while, reciprocally, growth requires ever-
renewed debts that, as we will see, can never all be repaid given the structurally inegalitarian, 
accumulation-driven dynamics of capitalism. 
 
Therefore, the matter of what monetary system might be more compatible with rapid measures 
to adapt to climate-driven disruption, including deep adaptation to societal collapse,3 and 
furthermore, to mitigate emissions while avoiding both public and private debt fiascos, is an 
important and even crucial one. Since capitalism’s entrenched inequalities make the situation 
structurally worse than it would be in a fairer system, the question really is whether capitalism 
is compatible with any serious effort to reduce the disruption from the environmental changes 
it is causing. We are continually disappointed when proposals for the reform of economies 
neglect even to mention the monetary system or, when they do, remain all too cursory and 
draw sketchy conclusions – at best – from the omnipresence of debt in capitalist credit-driven 
economies (e.g. Hickel 2020; Jones et al. 2020; Kallis et al. 2020). Of course, we could look 
at various aspects of monetary systems, alongside various elements that comprise modern 
capitalism, but in this paper we focus on the MGI because it has been either neglected or 
misinterpreted in recent years. 
 
2. What is a growth imperative? 
Economic growth remains the overriding policy goal of most governments around the world, 
even though they also measure other aspects of society such as health and wellbeing. 
Specifically, the idea of growth means a continuing, compounding increase of one or all 
countries' GDPs. Many arguments have been advanced for why growth is desirable (Daly 
1977 refutes a long list of such arguments). Regardless of the reasons, GDP growth has since 
World War II become an overriding and unquestioned policy objective (Hickel 2020: 92-94). 
 
3  Deep Adaptation is the term for an agenda and framework that is premised on the experience or 




The ever-increasing circulation of money is now baked into all modern economies, so that 
they become dysfunctional as soon as growth cannot be maintained (Chzhen 2016). This 
means that growth is required for the economy to work properly. 
 
Some commentators describe this situation as a growth imperative. Before continuing, we 
should state our understanding of the word “imperative”. The Collins Dictionary defines an 
imperative as "something that is extremely important and must be done”. There is a sense of 
compulsion and of a lack of choice, as something “must be done”. The definition does not 
specify the quality of the factor, such as its singular or non-contextual influence, or the values 
involved that make it so that something “must be done”. Therefore, a growth imperative would 
be a situation where an increase in GDP is required, due to various interrelated factors, in 
order to avoid situations which a population considers undesirable, such as bankruptcies and 
poverty. Therefore, an MGI would be a situation where the monetary system is a significant 
factor in making GDP growth necessary, in order to avoid the undesirable situations. It does 
not imply that the monetary system is necessarily the only factor “forcing” growth. 
 
The organisation Positive Money identified several ways in which growth has become an 
intrinsic part of politics, calling them the 'sources of growth dependency’. They are: to maintain 
employment and living standards; to reduce poverty; to avoid addressing other political, social 
and economic problems head-on; to improve government finances; to address high private 
debt; and to address high public debt (Positive Money 2018). 
 
But there are also other sources of growth dependency in economics, business and even 
culture: 
 
● Growth is argued by some to make people feel better about life, with the moral 
consequences of societies allegedly becoming more tolerant and progressive 
(Friedman 2006).  
● There is a widespread equating of growth with progress, which has become a 
fundamental aspect of modern identity, however problematic (Greer 2015: 41-42). 
● Because old technologies are not as economically efficient, companies must 
continuously invest in order to compete (Douthwaite 1992: 36), resulting in cheaper 
goods and much greater consumption.  
● Large companies tend to be more profitable because they have cheap access to 
capital and overcome high regulatory hurdles more efficiently. This leads to a tendency 
for companies to try to outgrow their competitors by producing and selling ever more. 
They are also encouraged, and frequently even obligated by law, to maximize 
shareholder value, which on average across an economy involves increased 
production (Smith 2010: 31). 
● In the popular imagination, reinforced by media narratives, there is the idea that growth 
is good and failure to grow means stagnation, recession, unemployment, austerity, 
etc., making it extremely difficult for politicians to act otherwise. 
 
Considering all this, it becomes clear that a societal transition away from growth would be very 
disruptive, would take a long time and would involve many winners and losers. It is incumbent, 
then, on those proposing a steady-state or degrowth economy, to propose the gentlest 
possible pathways as well as the most compelling arguments in order to be credible, or even 
to be heard. 
 
While these factors may constitute a growth imperative, this paper is concerned with how GDP 
growth might be unavoidable because it arises from key structural elements in contemporary 
capitalist economies, such as the way money is issued. Many arguments have been put 
forward for an MGI but no single one of them has garnered very widespread support (see, for 
example, Larue 2020). Our concern, however, is that if an MGI does nevertheless exist, as 
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we will argue it does in this paper, then some fundamental, far-reaching and – dare we say – 
politically unpalatable changes to our economy might be required if a steady-state or degrowth 
economy is desirable, and some respectable scholars may be reluctant to stand up for such 
changes, and hence for the notion of an MGI that would underpin them. 
 
3. The Monetary Growth Imperative (MGI) hypothesis 
In advanced economies such as the UK, around 97% of the money we use is in the form of 
bank accounts (Bank of England 2014: 5), which means it was created when someone else 
borrowed it into existence. That borrower is currently paying interest on that money, and when 
the debt is repaid the money will disappear. This debt, being the liability of a bank, is 
guaranteed by the government and is trusted and used in the vast majority of payments, and 
for a long-term store of value.  
 
The MGI hypothesis is not concerned with the other 3% of physical money, nor with the 
central-bank money used for interbank clearing. To remind the reader that for every dollar of 
money there exists a dollar of debt, this paper will sometimes refer to debt-money, meaning 
that temporary kind of money created on a bank's balance sheet. Debt-money, as opposed to 
other forms of money, is a source of profit for banks, as they can charge fees and interest on 
it, while having a government licence to create it, and it is much more elastic than commodity 
forms of money. On the other hand, it burdens debtors with what is effectively a rental charge 
on money, and it gives banks effective control over monetary policy, since they are the ones 
deciding, at a given interest rate, who gets new credit and how much.  
 
Surprisingly, debt-money is not understood by most people, most journalists, most 
policymakers,4 or even most mainstream economists (Keen 2011: 6). According to the Bank 
of England, the popular perception of the function of banks obscures their role in money 
creation by being literally back to front: “Rather than banks receiving deposits when 
households save and then lending them out, bank lending creates deposits.” (Bank of England 
2014: 14)  
 
Even nowadays, while this basic insight that it is loans that make deposits (and not deposits 
that make loans) has received more and more publicity, it still regularly gets dismissed as 
something resembling a conspiracy theory. Most of the people who do understand how money 
is actually created are therefore beyond the pale of mainstream economics. Indeed, it was an 
independent economist, Richard Douthwaite, who (as far as we could find) in 1992 and again 
in 1999 first asserted the existence of an MGI: 
 
Borrowers can only obtain enough money to pay their interest bills without reducing 
the amount of money in circulation if they, or other borrowers, borrow an adequate 
amount more. As a result, under the current money creation system, the amount of 
money in circulation has to rise, year after year, by a sum at least equivalent to the 
amount being removed from circulation by the banks as a result of interest payments. 
The amount removed is equal to the profits left to the banks after they have paid 
dividends to their shareholders in the country concerned, invested in new equipment 
and premises and met all their wages, salaries and other operating costs there. These 
profits will be held in accounts in the banks' own names and unless they are put back 
into circulation (by being spent or lent), the amount of money in circulation will fall. 
(Douthwaite 1999: 24, emphasis added) 
 
 
4  See Positive Money's survey of UK MPs in 2017: https://positivemoney.org/press-releases/mp-poll  
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Apart from being the first academic statement of the popular MGI hypothesis, this is, rather 
surprisingly, also the most detailed and explicit. We will criticize it shortly, but we do need to 
take it as a point of departure. In our reading of academic and popular literature on this topic, 
the only other precise statement of an MGI that we came across was from an independent 
scholar, Paul Grignon: “… if the interest [is] re-lent at interest or removed from circulation by 
hoarding, there will be an inherent shortage [of money] with which to pay off the aggregate 
debt.” (Grignon 20095, emphasis added) 
 
Apart from these two,6 all statements of the hypothesis we found were oversimplified and/or 
misleading. For example: "Banks loan only principal, but demand repayment of principal plus 
interest ... The only way each of these actors can achieve their goals is through the continuous 
creation of new money" (Farley et al. 2013: 280). The argument sounds similar to the 
preceding one, except for the fact that the authors seem to assume that the entirety of the 
interest repayments is somehow removed from the economy. Another example of 
oversimplification is from the popular philosopher Charles Eisenstein, whose book Sacred 
Economics states simply that "because debt is always greater than money supply, the creation 
of money creates a future need for even more money" (Eisenstein 2011: 79). He does not 
offer any explanation as to what mechanism operates here, but other statements in his book 
indicate that he adheres to the explanation that only principal repayments are covered by bank 
loans, not interest payments. 
 
The following statement also oversimplifies in suggesting that what leaves circulation and 
needs replacing are interest payments: 
 
When the loans are repaid, the new money is destroyed. However, the borrowers must 
repay the loans plus interest and the banks initially loaned out enough to repay only 
the principal. Either new government expenditures or new loans are required to pay 
back the interest. (Costanza et al. 2013: 42) 
 
Jason Hickel describes the same mechanism, not as a driver of growth itself, but as a driver 
of competition: “Banks create the principal for all the loans they give, but they don't create the 
interest. There is always a deficit, always a scarcity.” (Hickel 2000: 239) 
 
As we indicated in the Introduction above, we ourselves have, in the past, accepted and 
repeated these same arguments linking the MGI to interest payments (Lietaer, Arnsperger, 
Brunnhuber and Goerner 2012: 99-103, Bendell and Greco 2013: 226). In fact, however, there 
exists a significant literature setting out a variety of mechanisms and explanations for the MGI 
that, over and above this rudimentary interest-payments argument, attempt to understand how 
debt-money leads to growth. Strunz et al. (2017) provide a helpful taxonomy of these attempts. 
The post-Keynesian attempt to refute the MGI 
The idea that growth can be directly caused by monetary policy is seen by post-Keynesians 
as running counter to one of their defining tenets. Also wanting to oppose the monetarist tenet 
according to which monetary expansion will automatically translate into inflation, post-
Keynesians claim that the money supply responds to effective demand in the real economy, 
as famously expressed by Keynes when he wrote that "credit is the pavement along which 
production travels" (Keynes 1930: 219). In other words, they argue that monetary expansion 
happens not because credit is made more readily available, but because entrepreneurs 
anticipate rising effective demand and then borrow money into existence. While this is 
 
5  Go to 34:50. 
6  The only other academic publication describing an MGI in detail, by Binswanger (2009), portrays an 
entirely different mechanism. 
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undoubtedly an important insight, we do not see why it would preclude its antithesis. GDP 
growth is probably both the cause and the consequence of credit, through a variety of different 
causal mechanisms. In any case, it is from the post-Keynesian perspective that the strongest, 
if not the only, attempts to refute the MGI have come. 
 
The post-Keynesians developed a very helpful way of modelling economies by distinguishing 
between stocks of money and flows of money – so-called ‘stock-flow consistent’ modelling 
(see, for example, Godley and Lavoie 2006). For example, in any given period, the asset on 
the banks' balance sheet when a loan has been made is considered a stock, and the interest 
payment on it a flow. Post-Keynesians understand that repayments of principal will diminish 
the stock of debt, while repayments of interest will flow through the bank and back into the 
economy. The most prominent study in this direction is by Jackson and Victor (2015), who 
describe a stock-flow consistent model with banks and interest, debt-money, and zero growth. 
Their paper claims that “neither credit creation nor the charging of interest on debt create a 
‘growth imperative’ in and of themselves.” (Jackson and Victor 2015: 32, emphasis added)  
 
In order to make their model work with bank-issued debt-money as the main source of money 
in an economy, Jackson and Victor had to ensure not only that all interest payments were 
recirculated, but that all the pools in which money accumulates and stagnates were regularly 
drained: “Taxation is initially set so that government debt does not accumulate. Firms’ 
financing behaviour is determined in such a way as not to accumulate capital assets beyond 
those deemed necessary to satisfy expected demand.” (ibid.: 46) 
 
These are conditions that do not reflect either current or normal situations in a capitalist 
economy. Therefore, the following conclusion offered appears a bold extension of their 
theoretical findings into real-world implications: “… the results in this paper suggest that it is 
not necessary to eliminate interest-bearing debt per se, if the goal is to achieve a resilient, 
stationary or quasi-stationary state of the economy.” (ibid.: 44, emphasis added) 
 
The phrases we italicised above are crucial because they stress the theoretical nature of the 
finding, and that the universe of the model may not translate to the real world. Jackson and 
Victor are transparent enough in a number of caveats about what was lost in translation, such 
as: 
 
We are therefore firmly of the opinion that monetary reform is an essential component 
of a sustainable economy ... Aside from the question of interest-bearing money, there 
exist several other incentives towards growth within the architecture of the capitalist 
economy … Many of them are reliant on the existence of credit-based money systems. 
(ibid.: 44) 
 
Viewing the money system in terms of stocks and flows explains very well why most of the 
simplistic MGI formulations that we ourselves, like many others, had previously espoused 
were simply wrong. Rather than using complex computer modelling to make this point, an 
independent scholar explained it elegantly a decade ago in one sentence: “… a simple loan 
of interest need not produce a shortage of money or cause unpayable debt if flow is 100%.” 
(Grignon 20117) The question could then become the following: will flow ever be 100%, is that 
desirable, and if not, what might be the implications for policy? In addition, another important 
question is whether the reality of a less-than-100% flow of money from creditors back to 
debtors, even without interest being earned, means that there exists a growth imperative. 
 
On the surface, economists critiquing the mistakes of proponents of the MGI hypothesis might 
look like a technical discussion, but we will describe below what the political implications have 
 
7  Go to 5:37. 
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been. Jackson and Victor’s 2015 paper became something of a landmark in the field, 
influencing the fields of degrowth and environmental economics towards de-prioritising the 
taking into consideration of the MGI. This is illustrated, for instance, by the agendas of the six 
biannual international degrowth conferences. We found references to the MGI in three of the 
four conferences up to 2014, and none in the two conferences from 2016 onward (Box 1). 
 
 
Box 1: Likely mentions of MGI in the main International Degrowth Conferences 
(https://www.degrowth.info/en/conferences) 
 
Paris 2008  
Sparse documentation available. Declaration doesn't mention debt or money.8 
 
Barcelona 2010 
Designing financial institutions for a shrinking or no-growth economy (Douthwaite 2010) 
 
Venice 2012 
Degrowth, Debts and Money Creation: the B plan?9 
 
Leipzig 2014   
Building a social and ecological economy through a social accounting model of banking10 
 
Budapest 2016 
No mention of MGI11 
 
Malmö 2018 
2 sessions on money but MGI not mentioned12 
 
 
Many people we have met in the degrowth fields have been telling us that the MGI has been 
disproven, and have written as much (see Larue 2020). However, upon closer inspection, the 
artificial economic system postulated in Jackson and Victor’s FALSTAFF model, in which 
money hoarding and accumulation is explicitly chosen to not occur, thus making it possible to 
debunk a poorly articulated version of the MGI, appeared to us as rather problematic. 
 
4. Unrefuted arguments in favour of an MGI 
Strunz et al. (2017) describe a range of MGI arguments, rather than interrogating the various 
arguments and their respective justifications and refutations in detail. Although this approach 
is in many ways helpful, it can lead to an agnosticism concerning which analyses are more 
robust and what the implications are for people and planet. As social constructionists, we are 
interested in the ways that money is understood in both societies and scholarship. However, 
our attention to social construction aids a critical interrogation of the dominant ideas operating 
in society and academia, rather than framing the different arguments as primarily a matter of 
differing opinion or belief. Unfortunately, like many of the economists who do not conclude that 
the MGI definitely exists and requires attention, Strunz and his co-authors take the word 
“imperative” to mean a singular causal factor. We consider this to be an untenable assumption, 
as it is impossible to identify a singular causal factor in complex human systems. As a result, 
to expect the singling-out of single causal factors largely negates the existence of an MGI from 
the outset. 
 
8  http://degrowth.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Declaration-on-Degrowth-EN.pdf  
9  http://decrescita.it/decrescita/wp-content/uploads/Degrowth_Venice_full_program.pdf  
10  http://degrowth.community/conference2014/scientific-papers/3636  
11  http://scriptum.degrowth.net/en/budapest2016/public/schedule  




Reviewing the attempts to refute the various theories, we have arrived at our own preferred 
formulation of the MGI. In this section, we describe in our own words one mechanism which, 
as far as we are aware, is unrefuted, and we introduce two other related ones which we believe 
deserve attention.  
 
Before diving in, we would like to make explicit a feature common to most MGI arguments, 
which is that aggregate debt-money is closely correlated with GDP growth. This means that 
an imperative to grow the money supply strongly implies a GDP growth imperative.  
 
To put it in more detail: the transactions which make up GDP are the result of supply and 
demand seeking and finding each other (albeit never perfectly, since we are certainly not 
postulating a neoclassical equilibrium economy). More supply and more demand should 
equate directly to more transactions and higher GDP. When a debt is issued, the debtor 
typically spends the money, creating demand in the economy, and in order to repay their loan 
the debtor must supply the economy with something; thus, a debt enables first demand and 
then supply. Therefore – if we take the case of private debt held by a business (but we could 
also look at a household) – if an imperative exists for debt to grow, it seems certain that GDP 
must also grow, not merely by the amount of the debt, but by several times the amount, 
because only a small part of the business’s turnover is profit which can be used to pay debt 
(just as only a part of a household’s income can service debt over and beyond its other 
important expenses). 
 
Why do businesses – to continue with this case – take on debt? As the post-Keynesians have 
pointed out, entrepreneurs might take on debt because they anticipate more demand. This is 
certainly not a monetary imperative. There is, however, another very common case where 
debt is issued, namely, when debtors fail to service existing debt. Refinancing, restructuring, 
moving debt from credit cards to overdrafts, rolling over debts (i.e. taking out a new loan to 
pay off an older loan), unpaid interest becoming new principal debt – all this amounts to an 
increase in net debt. This means, in turn, that if the debtors in aggregate are not able to earn 
enough money to service their debt (over and above securing their livelihood), then aggregate 
debt must increase. This directs the focus onto the payability of debt and the rate at which 
money flows through the economy, and more specifically the parts of the economy where 
debtors can earn it. 
The ‘withdrawal from circulation’ mechanism 
A careful reading of Douthwaite’s passage quoted in the previous section reveals that while 
he did not make the stocks-and-flows error, he specifically blamed the practice of banks pulling 
some of their profits out of circulation, presumably to increase their liquidity ratio (see also 
Binswanger 2009: 725). This could lead to the view that the siphoning-off of only a part of bank 
profits would be sufficient to trigger mass default. In our opinion, there are numerous other 
ways in which money might fail to be available for debtors to earn. In order to argue this, we 
offer a broader explanation of what ‘out of circulation’ means, at least as far as debtors are 
concerned. 
 
One important way that money disappears is when it is used to repay a loan, i.e. when it 
literally cancels out the corresponding bank liability. This kind of removal from circulation is 
absolutely healthy and balanced. What we are concerned about here, rather, is money that 
goes out of circulation without, or before, extinguishing its corresponding debt.  
 
We would like to introduce a circulatory metaphor here. Sometimes money in an economy is 
compared to the circulation of the blood in a body, but this metaphor assumes that money 
circulates all the time. Imagine instead the whole water cycle, with its basic circuit, from the 
sea to the sky to the land to the rivers to the sea, but a lot of water is also locked away in the 
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Antarctic ice cap, in the groundwater, and in the deep ocean. All of the water is technically in 
the water cycle, all of it could nourish the crops, but often the crops go unnourished – the 
existence of drought is not evidence of lack of water but evidence of held-up water. The 
monetary ecosystem is similar. If principal debt and money are issued together, then enough 
money exists, by definition, to pay off all the principal debt. But the money does not necessarily 
flow where it is most needed to repay debts. Instead, much of it gets siphoned off and 
stagnates in great reservoirs, in a phenomenon economists call a lowered 'marginal propensity 
to consume'. In other words, the wealthiest people “have a greater propensity to leave their 
income sitting idly in a bank account … thus contributing to deficient demand in the rest of the 
economy.” (Stratford 2020) 
 
Stratford is alluding here to a general mechanism in capitalism called rent seeking. We are 
looking at a specific subcategory of this, having to do with what we will call the ‘hoarding’ or 
‘accumulation’ of money in circuits or pools not accessible to the bulk of debtors. Personal 
savings accounts, as well as corporate cash holdings like those of large technology firms,13 
but also (as we will see below) closed circuits of re-investments amongst the very wealthy, as 
well as widespread non-bank lending mechanisms, could be blocking circulation within the 
monetary system in a specific manner, with not enough money flowing back towards debtors, 
thus forcing the overall quantity of money to grow for debt-repayment reasons.  
 
This argument is best articulated (in German) by Freydorf et al. (2012) and Wenzlaff et al. 
(2014), and as far as we know, it has not been refuted. Strunz et al. (2017) explain the 
arguments of Wenzlaff et al. (2014) and Richters and Simoneit (2017) as follows:  
 
... the existence of positive interest rates alone is not sufficient to create a growth 
imperative. How creditors use the income they receive in the form of interest payments 
from debtors is crucial. If creditors fully consume their interest income, thereby re-
injecting it into the economy, a stable cycle without growth may endure. So, positive 
interest rates as such do not necessarily yield permanent growth (...). However, if 
creditors tend to hoard their income rather than to consume it, (...) money is drawn 
from the cyclical interrelation of debtors, banks and creditors. In consequence, 
economic dynamics will eventually come to a standstill unless new money is fed into 
the economy. As this monetary growth takes place via investments, it is necessarily 
accompanied by real growth. (Strunz et al. 2017: 337) 
  
Indeed, Freydorf et al. (2012) emphasize at the outset of their paper that (our translation) “the 
functioning of the money economy implies economic growth. The ‘necessity of growth’ is to 
be understood as the thesis that no socio-economic equilibrium is possible in the medium term 
without growth. This economic need for growth does not result from the money economy per 
se – nor from a positive interest rate level for loans alone – but from the combination of income-
dependent savings rates and liquidity preferences.” 
 
Some might argue that accumulating money is a good thing for degrowth and the environment, 
at least momentarily, if it means spending and consumption are deferred. We attempt to 
explain why this is not the case. Fig. 1 depicts spending and GDP as standing in a uniformly 
increasing, linear relationship. 
 







This would only be true, however, for money which once issued circulated indefinitely because 
it had intrinsic value or was backed by valuable objects. It does not hold in the case where 
money is created as debt, which is supposed to return on a certain date to the bank balance 
sheet from which it came and extinguish its corresponding liability. Debt-money can be thought 
of as representing the first half of a swap, which exists only temporarily and vanishes when 
the swap is complete. When debt-money is prevented from returning ‘home’, pressure builds 
on the remaining money supply and the system starts to become leveraged or distorted. In 
other words, as more money leaves circulation, it becomes harder for debtors in aggregate to 
service their debts, so newer money is brought forward to service older debts, leaving future 
loans outstanding. Where does the process end? 
 
If debt-money is like the first half of a swap, then the debtor has committed to completing the 
swap in the future. So every time a debt is deferred or extended because trade was slow, that 
means future GDP is required to compensate for it, and not just future GDP amounting to the 
value of the debt but several multiples of that – enough to generate a profit to the value of the 
debt. When this happens, we say that new debt ‘locks in’ future growth. This means that the 
above chart is only true above a certain level of spending, because when money is issued as 
debt, spending below a certain level means the economy must grow in order to avoid 
disruption, and the greater the shortfall in spending, the more new debt is needed to make it 
up, and the more future growth is locked in. The red line in Fig. 2 shows the range of (too low) 
spending that leads to locked-in future growth; this relationship is downward-sloping because 






The curve is V-shaped: too much or too little spending results either in present growth or in 
future (not yet materialised but already locked-in) growth. 
 
When confidence is high, people invest in the future by taking out loans, so the debt-money 
system grows. But when trade is slow, debt also grows as money is drawn down from the 
future to make up the shortfalls. However, this is not quite yet proof of a growth imperative, 
because if it were possible to constantly determine exactly the right level of spending relative 
to the amount of credit and to constantly direct that spending in the right amounts to every 
debtor, then the economy could sit in the ‘sweet spot’ shown in Fig. 3, right at the kink in the 
V. If this were the case, there might be no MGI. 
 
However, as soon as this process of constant adjustment becomes less than optimal, 
discrepancies in either direction result in an MGI, hence in growth. Policy tools would 
somehow be needed not just to control the aggregate amount of spending, but to ensure the 
sales volume of every debtor was within parameters that enabled their debt to be serviced but 
did not encourage them to borrow more. It is hardly imaginable that this kind of macro- and 
microeconomic management could take place in a capitalist economy. Therefore, in a 
capitalist debt-money economy, the ‘withdrawal from circulation’ mechanism will structurally 






What has just been argued is that an MGI will exist as soon as too much money (initially 
created as debt-money by banks) is slowed down or ‘congealed’ for too long, so that the ‘main-
street’ economy – which is made up of all the normal businesses and households who need 
to regularly scramble for sales, revenue or income to repay their debts and whose debts 
finance immediate and often essential expenses – is not receiving enough of it back, soon 
enough. This possibility of insufficient liquidity being spent back into the main-street economy 
is intrinsic to the very nature of debt-money in a capitalist system. 
 
‘Stagnant pools’ of liquidity get created by the very nature of accumulation. They can take the 
form of massive liquidity hoarding or of savings accounts left fallow for long periods of time. 
‘Stagnant pools’ can also be generated through what we will call ‘intra-elite re-investments’ on 
the part of those elites who either are not in debt or who incur debts only in order to make 
more money. The behaviour of such elites is not merely optional in capitalism – it forms part 
of its very essence, since accumulated money that does not circulate must become capital. 
  
As explained by Tarver (2020), 
  
Ultra-wealthy individuals invest in such assets as private and commercial real estate, 
land, gold, and even artwork. Real estate continues to be a popular asset class in their 
portfolios to balance out the volatility of stocks. While it's important to invest in these 
physical assets, they often scare away smaller investors because of the lack of liquidity 
and the higher investment price point. However, according to the ultra-wealthy, 
ownership in illiquid assets, especially ones that are uncorrelated with the market, is 
beneficial to any investment portfolio. These assets aren't as susceptible to market 
swings, and they pay off over the long term. For example, Yale's endowment fund has 
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implemented a strategy that includes uncorrelated physical assets, and it returned an 
average of 8.1% per year between June 2006 and June 2016. 
  
In other words, the 1 percent mostly invest in each other’s assets, buying and selling them to 
other members of the same wealthy elite (Warren Buffet is much more likely to buy some other 
billionaire’s mansion than a small suburban house), and this creates a set of what we could 
call ‘fenced-off’ pools of money: to the extent it is not wired off to an offshore fiscal haven 
(Shaxson 2011), hoarded or put in a savings account,  the money is not stopped from flowing 
altogether, but it flows only in a very restricted way between elite pools and very largely 
remains in them. This acts as a self-contained circuit whose contents no longer flow back into 
main street: for all intents and purposes, from the vantage point of the bulk of average debtors, 
the money has been siphoned off to a place where it has become inaccessible to them. 
  
The extent of this mechanism is difficult to estimate because data in these areas are fairly 
hard to get by. According to The Economist, “family offices have become a force in investing, 
with up to $4tn of assets—more than hedge funds and equivalent to 6% of the value of the 
world’s stock markets.”14 
  
In a BBC article revealingly entitled ‘Why the rich stay rich: They don’t invest like the rest’, 
journalist Bryan Borzykowski writes: 
  
The wealthy have access to a swath of investments that most people don’t even know 
exist. Closed-end funds — a long-term investment where money is typically tied up for 
at least five years — offer the very rich access to big returns and high yields. … It’s 
natural for wealthy individuals, many of whom made their money owning companies, 
to buy into other businesses. … Though investors put their money at risk — 50% of 
startup companies go bust, said Rose — a wealthy investor usually makes 20 times to 
50 times their initial investment on one or two companies that do succeed. … Many 
high-net-worth people like parking their cash — often seven or eight figures — on 
pieces of property … Some pool their money with others to buy commercial properties; 
others scoop up high-priced condos in London, New York and other global locales. 
Many hope to sell for a handsome profit, but in the meantime, they can live in these 
abodes when they travel. (Borzykowski 2014) 
  
High-net-worth individuals have much easier access to bank credit than average main-street 
citizens, but they do not need to go into debt in order to live their lives according to the norms 
of society. They may borrow several times in a row, but this is not to finance past loans for 
whose repayment they found no funding. They are in fact a major source of revenue for the 
banking system. In that sense, they are closer to being part of the capitalist banking system 
than to being its clients and debtors. In any case, whether they themselves borrow a lot or not, 
something like US$ 4tn being effectively gyrated around in ‘fenced-off’ liquidity pools 
represents a substantial draw on main-street opportunities for loan repayment. 
  
This mechanism, as stated above, is part of the very structure of capitalism; it is intrinsic to it 
and not merely a matter of some rich people’s choices or of their ‘bad behaviour’, whatever 
that may mean. ‘Intra-elite’ re-investment is one of the ways capital gets accumulated out of 
money that is not made available for loan repayments, thereby exacerbating the pressures for 
growth within a debt-based money system. 
 




‘Twice Lent Money’  
To better grasp the reality of the gap between actually circulating liquidity and potential liquidity 
withheld from circulation through accumulation, let us look at the work of Paul Grignon (2013, 
2018), who takes the ‘withdrawal from circulation' mechanism to another level. In doing so, 
Grignon offers another explanation as to why so little money might be available in relation to 
the debt which needs servicing. Not all loans come from banks that create the money on the 
spot. When that money can be deposited and re-lent on a secondary market through ‘non-
bank’ institutions practicing full-reserve lending, debt multiplies without any new money at all 
being made available to pay it off.  
 
Grignon coined the expression 'Twice Lent Money' to designate the case where the same 
dollar is saved, lent, spent and earned, saved, lent, spent and earned, etc. While that single 
dollar becomes the principal of many debts, it can only actually be used to pay a single one of 
those debts, after which it will most likely be re-lent. The only way these successive debts 
could all be unwound would be if the accumulation went into reverse, and each successive 
saver withdrew their money and spent it, so that each successive debtor could earn it and pay 
down their debt. 
 
Grignon backs up this view with public data from the US Federal Reserve. In normal banking, 
the principal debt and the money needed to extinguish it are created at the same time, hence 
in the same quantity. At the time of the 2008 crash, however, total principal debt was 4 times 
more than all bank money and 24 times the actual money available to borrowers to pay it.15 
This, he claims, can only be accounted for by multiple re-lending by non-banks, far over and 
beyond the initial bank loan. Note that non-bank lending includes not just things like 
mortgages, but also shadow banking. This non-bank lending has been increasing massively 
during the twenty-first century, so that it accounts for nearly two thirds of all lending (FDIC 
2019), making it a significant factor in the monetary system and the existence of an MGI. 
 
In light of this, we might wonder how post-Keynesian steady-state models have handled this 
massive non-bank lending and, if they have not, what other explanations they might be offering 
for the discrepancy between debt and the money available to pay it.  
 
Meanwhile, Grignon continues to try to engage mainstream economists with this way of 
understanding debt and the growth imperative: 
 
Conventional economics, which disregards the debt origin of money, views savings as 
assets, a store of wealth like wheat in a silo. But savings are, in reality, someone's 
debt, a scheduled promise to extinguish this money. Savings held indefinitely are a de-
stabilizing interruption of the credit cycle. If we fully recognize the debt origin of money, 
savings that are not available to be earned on time by the borrowers that created that 
money create Perpetual Debt. All is well when debt is growing, but when the supply of 
new bank credit slows down, for any reason, it can set off a hidden bomb of 
mathematically-induced defaults. (...) There is no recognition that the system’s stability 
depends on that bank credit being available to the general circulation as earnings, not 
secondary borrowing. (...) (Grignon 2013: 4-5) 
 
We include the concept of Twice Lent Money here, along with the analysis that it may be a 
significant factor in the MGI, in order to invite greater attention to it from economists.  
 





It appears that the earlier, simplistic formulations of the MGI, which all focused on interest, 
were mostly guilty of a shared stocks-and-flows fallacy, but they were basically correct in 
asserting that money ‘left’ the economy and that debtors, in aggregate, had to replace it by 
taking out new loans. What they weren't clear about was how the money left the economy, 
leaving readers to suppose that repaid interest just vanished along with the principle. Once 
we understand that any money which isn't being spent right now, is in a sense 'not in 
circulation' and is being 'accumulated', or 'hoarded' then the truth of what they said becomes 
apparent. This reconciles those early expressions with their debunkers like Jackson and Victor 
who showed that a debt-money system without capital accumulation would not need to grow.  
 
One important research question is why the default rate is so sensitive to rates of GDP growth. 
If a difference of about 2% in GDP growth means the difference between an economy 
considered healthy and functioning and one that goes into ‘recession’ (where money 
circulation is reduced, with negative impacts on employment, businesses and households), 
this suggests to us that the business cycle wobbles around some payability-of-debt threshold. 
Is there some mechanism which keeps the ratio between debt and the ability to service it on 
a knife’s edge? Given the lack of agreement amongst economists about how the business 
cycle works, this appears worth exploring.  
 
All the early MGI formulations focused on interest as the mechanism requiring GDP growth, 
which implies that high interest would make matters worse and zero interest would solve the 
problem. But that may not be the case. Indeed, Grignon was emphatic about this matter as 
early as 2009, explaining in ‘Money as Debt II’ that 
 
As long as all the coins [sic] taken in as interest are spent so that the borrowers can 
earn them, the same coins can be used to pay the interest over and over, the lender 
can profit by buying real things with his coin, but the coin itself must be spent, not lent 
nor removed from circulation. (Grignon 200916, emphasis added)  
 
Our assessment suggests that although interest rates might add to the problem by increasing 
accumulation and stagnation of money, even with low interest rates, debtors could still fail to 
make payments. Low rates are supposed in neoclassical economics to speed up the economy, 
but the last decade of recessions throws that mechanism into question. Low rates usually also 
lead to increased borrowing, which itself is an incentive to growth. Conversely high rates, while 
they would be expected to reduce the rate of (new) borrowing, also make debt harder to 
maintain. The problem is not the interest rate but the debt itself. 
 
When asking ourselves whether the MGI is real, we need to realize how inseparable the 
question is from the degree to which money gets accumulated. Now we understand what 
Jackson and Victor’s (2015) expression ‘in and of themselves’ means when they write that 
“neither credit creation nor the charging of interest on debt create a ‘growth imperative’ in and 
of themselves”. It means that only if one were to assume – highly unrealistically – that 
everyone behaved differently, or that money could not (as we argue it can be in section 5) be 
pulled out of circulation for long periods of time, would there be no MGI. In essence, they are 
claiming (trivially, it appears to us) that if some of the essential accumulation-generating 
properties of capitalism were somehow eliminated from capitalism, the latter could remain 
compatible with debt-money. Capitalism could then be shielded from the implications of a 
growth imperative, because any such imperative that existed would not be monetary. We 
disagree: within existing capitalist arrangements, there really is a growth imperative that is 
monetary. Without an awareness of this, we are falsely led to believe that steady-state, growth-
 
16  Go to 34:21. 
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agnostic or degrowth policies are possible in an economy still relying on bank-issued debt-
money as its primary means of exchange. Any variant of capitalism that might theoretically be 
compatible with such policy objectives would need to no longer rely on bank issuance of debt-
money for its prime means of exchange. 
 
From a policy-making perspective, an MGI trilemma emerges, shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4: The MGI trilemma. 
 
 
The trilemma is as follows:  
 
- In any debt-money system, money accumulation precludes degrowth. 
- It is possible to have money accumulation and zero growth, but not in a debt-money 
system. 
- It is (theoretically) possible for a debt-money system not to grow, as long as there is 
no money accumulation. 
 
A more nuanced view of an imperative is needed, which recognises that the economy is a 
complex system, in which there are no independent variables that influence everything else in 
isolation, without context. As we explained earlier, the term “imperative” means that something 
“must be done”, but it does not mean that one specific variable has to be the sole factor 
involved in making that so. If such a standard were used to assess imperatives, then nothing 
would ever be considered an imperative, either in economics or the rest of life. When Jackson 
and Victor say there is no imperative arising from debt-money, per se, they appear to be 
applying an impossible bar to the concept of an imperative. As the debt-money system in the 
real world is embedded within a larger system which also encourages money hoarding and 
accumulation, their FALSTAFF model actually highlighted that in normal economies, this 
hoarding and accumulation generate an MGI from a debt-money system. Although the 
Jackson and Victor (2015) paper reads as an attempt to dismiss the imperative mechanism, 
upon closer reading it shows how welded monetary growth is to our economy.  
 
Before progressing to discuss some implications, let us summarise what we see as unrefuted. 
In any economy where money hoarding and accumulation is not curtailed, the preponderance 
of money issued by private banks as debt, with or without interest, leads to a system-wide 
scarcity of money available to people and organisations to service their debts, unless there is 
continual economic growth. This monetary growth imperative may be accentuated, at a 
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system-wide level, by the practice of full-reserve re-lending of money that is issued initially by 
banks as debts. Therefore, increases in non-bank lending are not a remedy to the growth 
demands that arise because of bank-issued debt-money. Interest payments increase the 
transfer of money to those who are wealthy and more likely to hold that money in a stagnant 
form that is not available for debt servicing by others. Therefore, while interest charges may 
add to the growth imperative, they are not its original cause. 
 
We recognise that this MGI is not quite of the nature touted by some who want to focus on 
compound-interest mechanisms. However, rather than saying, 'There is no monetary growth 
imperative in and of itself,’ we emphasise that preventing growth in a debt-money economy 
would require absolute control over hoarded or accumulated money, in order to ensure that 
creditors in aggregate have access to enough liquidity to service their loans. Such ideas are 
highly antagonistic to capitalism, as they challenge a basic freedom of economic choice. With 
this in mind, we will provide some illustrative policy ideas towards the end of this paper. 
 
5. Capitalism and debt-money 
To today's incumbent elites, capitalism appears to be non-negotiable even before it is defined. 
This means that anyone who questions capitalism, either directly or by implication, risks being 
regarded as confused, outdated, irrelevant, impolite, extreme, or dangerous (Bendell and 
Doyle 2015). In order to remain acceptable to peers, funders and policymakers, environmental 
economists putting forward steady-state models could be inclined to frame these models as 
compatible with capitalism.  
 
Ready definitions of capitalism in dictionaries and the Wikipedia entry (which, while perhaps 
academically rudimentary, are nevertheless indicative of mainstream understandings) stress 
the existence of private ownership of capital with the purpose of profit and accumulation. For 
instance: “Capitalism is based on the accumulation of capital, whereby financial capital is 
invested in order to make a profit and then reinvested into further production in a continuous 
process of accumulation … economic activity is structured around the accumulation of 
capital.”17 
 
The centrality of accumulation to capitalism is why Marxist economist Minqi Li (2007, p. 29) 
commented that if a no-growth economy means not being able to accumulate capital, ‘then 
what's the point of being a capitalist?’ If capitalism could survive the transition to a post-growth 
economy, then it would be a strange system indeed: capitalism without the capitalists (McNeill 
Douglas 2019: 30). Even Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie, who also built a model purporting to show 
that the MGI does not exist, note that “in our full stationary economy ... there is no 
accumulation of private wealth. Assuming private wealth is tantamount to capital in a broad 
sense, no further accumulation of capital by the private sector as a whole occurs… 
Consequently it would not be a capitalist system.” (Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie 2016: 187) Other 
economists have chosen to emphasise the role of debt rather than capital accumulation as 
being foundational to capitalism. Some further refine the kinds of debt that are foundational, 
where it is “not [just] any debt, but debt that can be easily transferred from one investor to 
another, and preferably debt that is convertible into state money at any time.” (Pistor 2019: 
77)  
 
A New Institutionalist argument is that the current debt-money system and capitalism evolved 
together: “It is precisely in the growth of private credit – serving trade and geographical 
expansion – that capitalism finds its origins … .” (Svartzman et al. 2020: 273) Svartzman and 
his colleagues continue by stating that “the generalisation of interest-bearing money issued 
 
17  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism#Capital_accumulation 
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by banks was 'not only a facilitator of exchange but a “transformative power”’ … that entailed 
radically new relationships between creditors and debtors.” (Svartzman et al. 2020: 274) 
 
Debt has certainly been an enabler and a trait of capitalism as it has evolved up to this point. 
Without the ability to create new money through credit, every piece of gold and silver would 
have been used only once at a time, and it would have been immensely difficult to gather 
enough of it together in one place to finance large projects. The phenomenal economic growth 
of the last several hundred years would have been orders of magnitude slower. Tim Jackson 
sided with these definitions when he described the “basic features of capitalism, such as the 
creation of money as credit and the charging of interest on debt” (Jackson 2015).  
 
However, is the creation of money as credit, rather than the creation of credit, a key aspect of 
capitalism per se? For credit instruments, such as bank-issued electronic deposits, to serve 
as ‘money’, they must be authorised as such by governments and enabled to circulate as 
seamless means of exchange, more or less interchangeable with the physical cash issued by 
either government mints or central banks (depending on the national system). The current 
debt-money system, where well over 95 percent of all money in circulation in OECD 
economies is bank-issued debt, is a conscious (or confused) choice on the part of 
governments, and it is qualitatively different to the forms of debt instrument that have been 
used as payment throughout the history of capitalism. That capitalism can exist without a bank-
issued debt-money system is highlighted by recent histories of full-reserve banking in 
countries like Myanmar. Therefore, it is neither self-evident nor historically obvious that the 
creation of money as credit is a foundational aspect of capitalism. Instead, it would appear to 
be a choice of the economist to regard capitalism in that way – a choice some economists, 
like Jackson, have made.  
Framing the MGI 
Regarding the current bank-issued debt-money system as central to capitalism means that 
any scholar aiming to show that steady-state or degrowth economies are compatible with 
capitalism would necessarily have to dismiss the MGI. Jackson, who incidentally was 
somewhat of a latecomer when it came to giving monetary phenomena a more than cursory 
place in his discussion of ‘prosperity without growth’ (Arnsperger 2010a), realises this when 
he writes that “if an MGI were shown to be the case, it would certainly seem to rule capitalism 
out of any sustainable form of post-growth or steady-state economy.” (Jackson 2015)  
 
This could explain why, despite all the caveats in his 2015 paper with Peter Victor, the 
conclusion they offered as the takeaway message was that the MGI had been disproved. The 
pair must have understood before they started what Steve Keen put so bluntly: “So why is [the 
MGI] wrong? In words, it’s because it confuses a stock (debt in dollars) with a flow (interest in 
dollars per year).” (Keen 2015). 
 
As discussed above, in order to prove there need not be an MGI due a money system based 
on bank-issued deposits, Jackson and Victor (2015) had to model the economy in a way that 
restricted the kind of capital accumulation occurring in a normal capitalist economy. This 
limitation was found in other models:  
 
A number of studies (Jackson and Victor, 2015; Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie, 2016) 
previously concluded that the monetary system does not contain a growth imperative. 
In particular, they find that interest-bearing debt and no-growth can theoretically co-
exist under a condition of zero net private savings. (Positive Money 2020: 25, emphasis 
added) 
 
Our problem is the following. Suppose Jackson and Victor’s alleged insight were to lead to 
government policies that disincentivise, restrict or prevent the use of money for storing value 
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through accumulation. This would emphatically not leave capitalism unchanged; it would 
fundamentally change our understanding not only of capitalism, but of money as a medium of 
exchange and as a store of value. Yet some have taken Jackson and Victor's study as a 
vindication of the possibility of maintaining the current system of bank-issued debt, despite the 
ecological crisis. 
 
One example of how their conclusions had an impact in the field is a booklet on societal 
disruption from climate change. It explains that new research by Jackson and Victor (2015), 
among others, on the possibility of eliminating a 'growth imperative' from a market system, has 
resulted in modelling of an economy which does not grow, does not crash and yet retains 
many of our currently recognisable forms of capitalist organisation (McNeill Douglas 2019: 
16). 
 
Having done a similar study, Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie concluded: 
 
Both endogenous money and our theoretical investigation show that growth 
imperatives are not to be found in the money creation process… Therefore, an 
economic system with a full-fledged financial system can exist without a monetary 
growth imperative. (Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie 2016: 167) 
 
The sense that the debate was (nearly) over was reflected by Cahen-Fourot in a degrowth 
seminar: "I think degrowth would benefit from moving forward … to stop considering this 
belief."18 Similarly, Jackson himself has also consciously attempted to shift the debate: “A 
more credible candidate for a growth imperative lies in the relentless pursuit of labour 
productivity.” (Jackson 2015).  
 
But we are less hasty to 'move forward'. We fear that sweeping statements which brush capital 
accumulation under the carpet as a determining factor for an MGI could mislead capitalists 
and activists alike, and give rise to shallow solutions that merely deflect or mask the problem. 
Bridging capitalism and environmentalism? 
As the title Prosperity without Growth suggests, Jackson has been trying to steer a course 
between the capitalist Scylla, with its limits to politically acceptable discourse, and the 
environmental Charybdis, with its physical limits to what can be extracted. For a moment, in 
2009 when the book came out, it seemed possible. The book suggests that the drivers of 
growth are not structural, which would require the redesign of capitalism, but more incidental, 
thus requiring merely the changing of a few laws and ideas: "a faulty economics drives and is 
driven by a distorted social logic" (Jackson 2009: 204). 
 
This was the kind of message that commissioners of the book, the UK Government's 
Sustainable Development Commission, needed to hear, along with attempts to redefine 
capitalism: 
 
Is it still capitalism? Does it really matter? For those for whom it does matter, perhaps 
we could just paraphrase Star Trek’s Spock and agree that it’s ‘capitalism, Jim. But not 
as we know it.’ (Jackson 2009: 202) 
 
The debunking of the MGI appears entirely consistent with this attempt to appease capitalism: 
 
Scholars who rely on post-Keynesian economics' theory and methods (e.g. Cahen-
Fourot and Lavoie 2016; Jackson and Victor 2015) argue that a 'monetary growth 
 
18  https://youtu.be/xxyTLmsOarU?t=1040  
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imperative' does not exist. As a result, this group tends to favour policies that do not 
challenge the foundations of the current monetary and financial system. (Svartzman et 
al. 2020) 
 
Reporting on the latest models made with Victor, a decade after the jocularity of the 2009 Star 
Trek reference, Jackson seems to have less to offer capitalists: 
 
The post-tax rate of profit from capital in the Base Case and GHG Reduction scenarios 
remain[s] fairly stable over the 50-year projection ... The share of income to capital 
remains within the historical norms associated with a capitalist economy in all three 
scenarios. (Jackson and Victor 2019: 311) 
 
That turns out to be small comfort, however, as the chapter draws to its conclusion: 
 
It is certainly conceivable that changes of this kind would necessitate some decline in 
the power of those who own capital assets, particularly where this power is 
concentrated in a few wealthy people. At the very least, it seems clear that the form of 
hypercapitalist society that characterises the early 21st century would have to change 
substantially. But none of this entirely excludes the possibility that some aspects of a 
capitalist society would survive. (Jackson and Victor 2019: 312) 
 
Jackson's heroic efforts and intellectual honesty have not been lauded or even recognised by 
elites, and now he is mostly mentioned only by environmentalists and the Left. Unfortunately, 
the middle way seems no closer now than it was in 2009, and we argue this means it is time 
for more radical tactics. In that light, we hope that the MGI will be restated, and reinstated in 
a more credible form, along the lines we have discussed here, to make the point amongst 
activists and politicians as to how profound the needed changes are.  
 
It is worth noting that more radical analysis has continued to exist over the decades – namely, 
the view that growth can only be stopped through radical, structural changes: 
 
Daly, Jackson and the rest are mistaken to assume that we can get a sustainable 
‘steady state’ economy or ‘de-grow’ the economy ‘within a capitalist framework.’ ... the 
idea of a steady-state or de-growing capitalism is based on spectacularly untenable 
assumptions, starting with the assumption that growth is optional rather than built into 
capitalism ... such pressures would prevail in any conceivable capitalism. (Smith 2010) 
 
Why, then, has there been such unnecessary and unhelpful confusion about the MGI? Would 
it be fair to consider that people whose lifestyles and livelihoods are paid for by establishment 
institutions are less likely to directly challenge those institutions? Or that such people might 
prefer reaching conclusions that do not imply a need to organise and struggle in ways that risk 
their lifestyles and livelihoods? It appears to us that establishment economists would rather 
make an argument that capitalism could adapt to anything, than to recognise that a systemic 
abuse of power and privilege by the issuers of money compels people, undemocratically, to 
both compete amongst one another and increase their economic activity (e.g. by becoming 
ever busier, taking more risks, or putting more risks onto others) – all of which feeds climate 
change and systemic extractivity (Hickel 2020). The former position – that capitalism could 
adapt to anything – would turn the degrowth field towards research, education and 
communication; the latter position would mean looking at tactics for building contrarian political 




6. Critical transdisciplinarity  
Why have we pointed to the way assumptions about the nature of capitalism, as well as a pre-
existing desire to not appear anti-capitalist, seem to have influenced the work of a number of 
significant economists in the steady-state and degrowth field? There are three key reasons.  
 
The first reason is to bring attention to how economists who have the resources, training and 
status of the establishment can have outsized influence over social movements which critique 
that establishment. All three of us have witnessed the de-prioritisation of the MGI in 
discussions and campaigns because it was believed to have been debunked by Post-
Keynesians. This meant, among other things, that discussions about the need for and means 
of organising to challenge the power of banks and to denounce the effects of capital 
accumulation may have been undermined.  
 
A second reason is that it is not uncommon for scholars to reach and promote less radical 
conclusions than social or political movements. Scholars are generally less radical than the 
general public (Schmidt 2001). Becoming a socially or ecologically critical intellectual who 
dares to present him- or herself as informing militant and activist organisations requires major 
epistemic as well as emotional shifts (Arnsperger 2008, 2010b). Therefore, the same 
processes of seeking to make analyses and recommendations palatable to incumbent elites 
will be occurring elsewhere, including in fields of urgent concern such as public health and 
climate change. There is a bias towards the status quo, with the aim of seeking to sound 
reasonable within the current mainstream. Wishing to sound reasonable to power, or to avoid 
mistakes that might generate criticism from professional peers, restricts the boldness of one’s 
analysis.  
 
But perhaps the greatest barrier to radicalism amongst academics is the preference to see 
matters of oppression and exploitation as requiring more knowledge and education, rather 
than more organisation amongst people and more struggle against power. Academics and 
scholars tend to find it difficult and even excruciating to become ‘existential activists’ in the 
sense of Arnsperger (2009). Both organisation and struggle involve far more risks and 
emotionally difficult experiences (as well as highs) than being paid to read, write and teach 
about ideas. Therefore, there can be a tendency to promote the ideology of ideology – that 
ideas matter to an extent that they can be abstracted from their social context and considered 
to not be co-products of the power relations within which people exist.  
 
A third reason is because we wish to establish the case for the skills of critical 
transdisciplinarity. The analysis in this paper suggests that there is a limited level of criticality 
in economics, like many fields of scholarship, whereby many concepts and frames are 
assumed and not unpacked for the ideological constructs that they are. Anthropologists who 
have studied academia, including the discipline of economics, can shed light on why this may 
be the case (Strathern 2005). One review of the ways academic disciplines are produced and 
maintained explains, without any intended judgement: 
 
In academia disciplinary languages are developed at least in part with the goal of 
protecting knowledge and disciplinary identity from outside infringement. If knowledge 
would be universally understandable and easily available for everyone, the specialists 
in the disciplines would lose their authority and influence as the most important 
interpreters of their discipline’s accumulated knowledge. (Krishnan 2009: 24).   
 
The lack of meaningful engagement by economists with thinkers like Paul Grignon is an 
example of how this process of discipline construction and defence is problematic for 




Within economics, one way that the disciplinary defensiveness is maintained is through the 
promotion of the myth of objectivity. The implication is that some economists’ analysis is better 
because they are less emotionally involved in the topic. This can mean that they do not 
question or state their values and intentions. In actual fact, it is the other way around: positing 
oneself as ‘objective’ is often a highly subjectively-driven endeavour attached to many 
concealed emotional hang-ups and denials, whereas it has become recognized as objectively 
true that our subjectivities are socially constructed, since childhood and into the specific 
profession we are working in. If we do not consider how our subjectivities influence our 
approach to research, shape what we are interested in, and affect our perception and our 
judgements on the validity, knowledge and appropriateness of conclusions, then our research 
should be regarded as flawed (Nelson and Nelson 1996; Arnsperger 2010b). One way to 
overcome the false myth of objectivity and develop critical subjectivity is to be trained in critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough 2001). Analysing the language we ourselves use can help 
expose our own ideologies, and this can then help us become more lucid as to the framings 
of any academic discipline we look at. 
 
Unfortunately, the most senior people in any academic discipline have tended to remain within 
that discipline in order to become senior, which means they have not left the discursive water 
within which they swim, and therefore risk more unacknowledged bias shaping their work than 
transdisciplinary scholars. One way to enable transdisciplinarity is for scholars to collaborate 
closely with non-academic activists, as they bring a focus on social systems which has not 
been structured by the categories and preoccupations of a particular discipline. This is one of 
the benefits the three of us reap from working together on the research for this paper. We 
claim that our ability not to be hampered by ‘establishment shackles’ in uncovering an actually 
existing MGI in capitalism stems from two transdisciplinary sources: first, while we would of 
course welcome an audience within academia, we are neither all academics nor all 
economists (only one of us is both), so that the main intended beneficiaries of our work are 
outside of academia; and second, we feel no need to balance out our professional interests in 
a way that would make us hesitate to indict capitalism, or aspects of it, and to draw anti- or 
post-capitalist conclusions from our MGI analysis. 
 
7. Disruption, breakdown, collapse 
Our concern with how the MGI has been falsely debunked is that it has influenced 
conversations and initiatives amongst activists and political movements, as described earlier. 
That is not a minor matter, but a paradigmatic one, as we shall explain. If we recognise the 
existence of an MGI then we realise how humanity has been trapped, repressed and exploited 
by monetary systems: en masse, we have been increasingly compelled to busy ourselves with 
more production, trade and consumption, whether we wanted that or not. That is a completely 
different starting point from an environmentalism that regards our environmental problems as 
arising from unchecked human behaviour, or even problems of human nature, such as 
addiction. Without awareness or acceptance of an MGI, environmentalism risks being stuck 
in a moralising discourse about using carrots or sticks to affect behaviour. In an essay on the 
ideology that has driven our exploitation of each other and nature (called the ideology of 
“escape”), one of us has recently challenged this anti-freedom paradigm of environmentalism:  
 
Any meaningful environmentalism should be first and foremost a movement for our 
liberation from those systems of oppression that have been forcing us into the insanity 
of destroying the life-support system of ourselves and our families. Unless the 
monetary system changes, the ideology of e-s-c-a-p-e will continue to be fuelled during 
forthcoming societal disruption. However, because environmentalists have been 
trapped within the e-s-c-a-p-e ideology, they have framed the problem as one of side 
effects and accidents that need our better management and control. Honest 
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environmentalism must now involve the aim and effort for humans to be free to be able 
to connect to, honour and sustain our environments. Any other environmentalism is a 
lie. The atmosphere tells us that it is a lie, with the fact of 416ppm CO2 in June 2020. 
(Bendell 2020) 
 
One can only imagine what a decade of activist discussion about liberating ourselves into 
environmental sustainability might have achieved. In addition, if the MGI had been 
foregrounded we might more easily have engaged with the social justice dimension because 
the arguments in this paper add to a growing body of evidence that economic inequality – 
caused by the compound effects of decades upon decades of capital accumulation – is 
harmful for human society, not only as a moral outrage, but systemically. It does that by 
showing how in a debt-money economy, unspent or accumulated money acts as a vacuum 
which sucks ever more new debt-money into being, and results in an increase in monetised 
economic activity – i.e. GDP growth – to justify that additional money. 
 
While some steady-state or degrowth economists spent a decade trying to reassure the 
wealthy that their accumulated assets – which, as we have shown, underlie the capitalist 
economy’s MGI – would not be socialised by this environmental agenda, these assets now 
face a greater risk of being naturally incinerated or blown away, seized by hungry mobs, or 
sinking underwater (Greenfield and Watts 2020). There is an argument that none of this 
matters very much because a climate catastrophe and peak energy will soon put a messy end 
to economic growth regardless of anything our governments do or not do (Servigne and 
Stevens 2020). Many believe humans face the loss of civilisation and progress, while others 
are worried about our own extinction (Bendell 2018). However, our view is that what we do 
about economic growth, and by extension emissions, biodiversity and social equity, matters 
both within our lifetimes and to our descendants. The greater our emissions, the greater the 
disruption to planetary systems, to species, to food sources and to the oceans, and the longer 
it will take them to recover and stabilise (Servigne and Steves 2020). Political choices we 
make now matter greatly for the long-term future of humanity. Instead of helping us reduce 
emissions and adapt to climate change, the financial system is amplifying crises and 
accelerating climate change and the collapse of our civilisation (Servigne and Stevens 2020). 
Therefore, what we do about monetary systems matters. 
 
In particular, we need to face up to the socio-economic and political realities of the massive 
changes required to reduce harm in the face of disruption from ecological and climatic change. 
Simply put: the environmental predicament means that some people will need to make do with 
less consumables than they have now, while also discovering more leisure and community 
engagement. Climate change negotiations have already revealed a standoff between rich and 
poor nations, resulting in decades of inaction. Within countries, we have also seen an 
Australian government fall and social unrest in France leading to policy reversals due to the 
introduction of carbon taxes (Rootes 2014). It will be impossible to convince economically poor 
people to either cooperate with or co-lead political programmes towards reducing climate 
change and adapting to the damage, without the rich first contributing far more. In the context 
of a shrinking economy, if the rich refuse to reduce their accumulated money, it will result in 
destitution for everybody else, with predictable disruption. A debt-money system makes these 
problems more acute, because it means that if the economy stops growing, while savings are 
maintained, then the various impacts of recession kick in, such as unemployment, 
bankruptcies, foreclosures, and ultimately, poverty.  
 
Reversing GDP growth means somehow reducing the accumulated money and its 
counterpart, the accumulated debt. The practical answer would be to use the money of the 
rich to pay off the debts of the poor either by the rich employing or donating to the poor, or 
having their money confiscated; capitalism, meanwhile, is still gouging the poor to heap money 
on the rich. When economic contraction is forced, capitalist systems have channelled the 
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impact towards the poor. The Covid-19 lockdown has been a textbook example, as many 
larger and better-connected businesses have been able to take advantage of government 
support (Blundell et al. 2020). 
 
When the disruption and breakdown of societies is likely, inevitable or already underway, a 
debt-money system will cause unnecessary harm because of the MGI. Given that the 
response to Covid-19 has created massive public and private debt at levels not seen since 
World War II, the financial system which captures savings and makes them unavailable for 
debt repayments is likely to generate pressure towards what Herman Daly called ‘uneconomic 
growth’ (growth that cause human harm and ecological degradation) at the very time when 
growth should no longer be an option. Unless every single debtor is constantly kept in the 
close neighbourhood of their ‘sweet spot’ as defined in section 5 – and we know that a 
capitalist economy with unregulated markets and no power for governments to issue and 
distribute currency directly to citizens cannot perform this prodigious fine-tuning feat – there 
will either be too much spending (generating present growth that will lead to further debt) or 
too little (locking in future growth). The traditional means of growing, taxing and privatising to 
service these debts will be highly problematic. 
 
Instead, fresh thinking on the matter of how national and local governments, networks of 
businesses and grassroots communities all issue money will be needed. It is our view that far-
reaching monetary adaptation is needed to cope with the coming planetary emergencies, 
including the climate crisis. It may not be possible to avert a collapse, but it should be possible 
not to exacerbate problems with a money system designed for the bygone era of constant, 
indiscriminate economic expansion. Therefore, scholars, activists and policymakers who are 
alive to the risks of societal disruption and collapse should consider the importance of the 
current monetary system in their future efforts. The support of entrepreneurs, corporate 
executives and investors will be critical to any transformation of the monetary system. 
 
8. Policy implications 
There is an urgent need for discussion of policy innovations outside of the current paradigm. 
Unfortunately, the de-prioritisation of the MGI has meant that relevant policy proposals are 
few. For example, the Capital Institute includes "Test Sovereign Money'' in its list of policy 
proposals (Fullerton 2020). However, this is tied to a suite of suggestions for what to fund with 
that money, and does not explain the innovation with the aim of addressing the MGI (Fullerton 
2020). The proposals in the book Doughnut Economics include a rethinking of economic 
growth, but it argues that there is an addiction to growth, rather than a systemic requirement 
for it, and therefore proposes negative interest as a way to discourage growth (Raworth 2017: 
275-276). In contrast, Positive Money's monetary reform campaign has kept the MGI in focus 
(Svartzman et al. 2020). 
 
The types of solutions we have in mind are about how to ensure debt is payable without driving 
the destruction of societies or the environment. Note that these ideas are selected only for 
their potential to mitigate the MGI, and that many other policies are needed to transform 
economies to enable bold carbon emissions mitigation, drawdown and adaptation. Below our 
proposals include those which would free up accumulated money for creditors to earn, and 
those which would reduce dependence on debt-money. 
 
● While debt-money could be made sufficient for circulation and productive investments 
linked to ecological transition but nothing more, interest-free or debt-free money could 
be issued in sufficient quantities to meet the (growing) needs of savers. The latter could 
be issued directly by the state, in the form of digital cash from either central banks or 
government treasuries (Positive Money 2013, and see below), or even by local 
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governments (Varoufakis 2020) if done according to common standards to maintain 
confidence and equivalence of value (Slater et al. 2018). It could also be issued by 
banks or other corporations, which raises concerns about their privilege and power in 
doing so (Slater and Bendell 2017). 
● Different currencies for accumulation and for circulation would give governments much 
more flexibility around monetary policy. These currencies need not have a 1:1 fixed 
exchange rate. 
● Credit clearing systems offer a way of making payments without the medium of 
exchange driving economic growth, with other benefits also accruing to members. 
There are many examples, largely overlooked by both the fields of monetary 
economics and environmental economics. One is the Slovenian government running 
a credit clearing system for some decades, which is claimed to have saved the 
economy in at least two crises (Fleischman et al. 2000). 
● Monetary reserve ratios could be reintroduced for banks, enabling credit creation to be 
(strongly) restricted by government policy. Governments could issue credit guidance 
(Monserand 2019: 11) to banks as in wartime, to ensure funding for sectors which 
helped respond to public challenges (Bezemer et al. 2018).  
● In principle, negative interest rates should reduce the aggregate accumulation of 
money, making aggregate debt more payable. However, we should note that the last 
decade of ultra-low rates has not prevented the richest from accumulating faster than 
ever. Further research is needed to examine how the widespread use of negative 
interest rates will affect the behaviour of individuals, companies and financial 
institutions in ways that might affect the MGI.  
● A national plan could be drawn up to create more local, not-for-profit banks, owned by, 
and mandated to serve, local communities and local businesses (Werner 2017).19 
● A national plan for the creation of local liquidity networks (see, for example, Slater and 
Jenkin 2016) could facilitate trade with interest-free mutual credit, organised by local 
governments or other bodies, to reduce the demand for bank-debt money.20 
● A new international agreement on the forgiveness of both public and private debt when 
more than the equivalent of the principal has already been repaid (see, for example, 
the Jubilee 2000 campaign21). 
● A new international agreement on international reserve currencies could replace the 
hegemony of the US dollar as demand for the dollar drops along with a fall in demand 
for oil. The new regime should be focused on avoiding any direct or indirect incentive 
for economic growth. This could include revisiting Keynes’s idea of an International 
Clearing Union, proposed at Bretton Woods in 1944.  
 
For economists who work within a paradigm that does not recognise an MGI, many of these 
proposals might appear peculiar. To help shift the conversation, influential economists need 
to return to the matter of an MGI and draw policymaker attention to the problem. 
 
We broadly support Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) as a way of transferring political power 
back from the private to the public sphere. MMT is not so much a set of policy proposals as a 
way of understanding the monetary system that permits much more government spending 
without being excessively ‘hawkish’ about the deficit and the debt (Kelton 2020; Arnsperger et 
al. 2021). While the supporters of MMT often see it as a way to finance the transition to a low-
carbon economy (Arnsperger 2020), from the perspective of degrowth some caveats are in 
order. Firstly, such a transition is often viewed by politicians as a means to reviving GDP 
growth, albeit ‘sustainable’, ‘green’ or ‘decoupled’ growth (Dunphy 2019), which is arguably 
not a transition at all. Secondly, at the end of the proposed transition, the resulting economy 
 
19  The Public Banking Institute is campaigning for this in the USA: http://publicbankinginstitute.org  
20  See http://creditcommons.net for more details. 
21  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubilee_2000  
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might be either not feasible or not very green, as the oil lobby is only too keen to point out 
(Mills 2019).  
 
There has been increasing discussion about central banks creating digital versions of physical 
cash, rather than relying on electronic bank-deposits as the only means of electronic fiat 
currency (BIS 2018). These are being described as Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), 
although government treasuries, tax offices or mints could issue these electronic forms of cash 
(Varoufakis 2020). They could either provide accounts directly to citizens or via payment 
company intermediaries. One approach is where a central bank or government agency could 
issue money in the same way cash is issued – as interest-free liabilities of circular 
commitments. Depending on the way the currency and accounts interface with the existing 
payments infrastructure, each unit of this new money could be a new asset without a 
corresponding liability, and therefore capable of settling multiple debts. Conversely, it could 
also be saved without depriving debtors of the opportunity to repay what they borrowed. 
 
CBDCs would likely give governments a stronger role in monetary policy and payments 
infrastructure. At this early stage in the design process, economic and policy possibilities are 
numerous and opportunities to mitigate the MGI abound, which is why we give them some 
attention here before concluding. One significant option is that if these forms of currency are 
established, then a government could pass regulations to replace bond sales with simple 
issuance of electronic cash as a means of financing its deficit and public spending. A 
government could then consider approaches to its financing that do not require greater 
economic growth, or restricting itself to what the financial and bond markets consider credible. 
Therefore, in this way, CBDCs present a threat to the profitability of banks, in issuing loans 
and trading in bonds, as well as to their global power, through the way they influence 
government policies through bond and foreign exchange markets. The power of international 
banks may be the reason why, despite the idea for CBDCs originating in the UK (Positive 
Money 2013), it has been China that led the way in experimenting with the release of CBDCs 
at the city level during 2020. As they are also considering ways to make the Chinese CBDCs 
a monetary instrument for international trade, the geopolitical interests are significant. 
 
For these reasons, there will likely be negative publicity campaigns against CBDCs in an 
attempt to protect incumbent power. Important issues, such as offline transactions, privacy 
and inalienable transaction rights, must be upheld with CBDCs, just as they should be upheld, 
but are not, with the current systems of electronic payments provided by the private banking 
systems (such as Visa, Worldpay, BACS, SWIFT and so on). Given how dire the situation is 
with the environment, it would be tragic if the efforts of incumbent power and geopolitical fears 
led to misinformation campaigns that slowed the exploration of this potential tool for reducing 
the MGI. However, just because CBDCs could provide a means for reducing the MGI does 
not mean that they will, unless the political will emerges. Therefore, all these ideas need 
intensive policy activism and advocacy to push them onto political agendas. Sadly, the 
environmental predicament and the financial implications of the pandemic mean that societies 
have very little time to achieve necessary revolutions in monetary policy.  
 
In addition to promoting awareness of these needed policy changes, we would encourage 
members of the public to also take direct, personal action on monetary issues, such as: 
 
● Using and creating alternatives to debt-money as a medium of exchange (Greco 2001), 
for example, through the use of barter networks, mesh credit and various local currency 
systems22 
 
22  This is our term for payment networks in which members vouch for each other individually, allowing 
promises to be relayed between strangers. 
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● Using and creating real alternatives to debt-money as a store of value, bearing in mind 
that the energy consumption of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin is highly 
problematic and that stablecoins derive their value ultimately from bank deposits 
● Developing ways to invest savings in local businesses, with the potential of non-
monetary returns, such as through the issuance of community shares23 
● Participating in the recently commenced 'Money Rebellion',24 a campaign to encourage 
citizens to resist or default on bank debt in order to force attention to the need for 
systemic reform in the face of environmental catastrophe. 
 
Perhaps there might be uncommon allies for such systemic changes in the monetary system. 
With an MGI, the current system of money issued as debt by private banks is creating a 
systemic economic risk linked to the impacts of ecological breakdown. These impacts come 
in many forms and are increasing. Therefore, perhaps an argument could be found that 
institutional investors, especially pension funds, could benefit from the kinds of monetary 
reform policies that we offer here. At the very least, it would not seem consistent with their 
fiduciary duty towards savers and investors for fund managers to not seriously examine the 
above ideas, with a view to aligning their political influence accordingly.  
Conclusion 
Economics is a discipline which prides itself in being relevant to policy. To be valid for policy 
discussion, reasons for rejecting the hypothesis of a Monetary Growth Imperative (MGI) 
occurring in the real economy should be both factual and implicative: factual, as they should 
present the MGI hypothesis accurately, in full context, and show that it cannot possibly occur 
in the real economy; and implicative, by showing clearly why focusing on debt-money would 
be problematic for intended policy aims.  
 
After reviewing much of the research and commentary that has rejected the plausibility of an 
MGI, we have found that none of it presented the MGI hypothesis accurately or was definitively 
able to reject it as a feature of the real economy as it exists today. Nor did the authors involved 
explain why it is counterproductive to focus on debt-money in policy innovation aimed towards 
either a steady-state or a degrowth economy. For instance, we have yet to come across a 
clear statement by any debunker of the MGI about why reducing the ability of banks to create 
debt-money when they issue loans would be bad for people, business, government or the 
economy. We have also yet to read a clear explanation of why seeking to reduce banks’ 
capacity to issue debt-money should necessarily sideline other matters of interest to steady-
state or degrowth economics, or why these other matters are necessarily more important than 
an MGI. In other words, why should all models that seek to assess the latitudes for degrowth 
or stationarity start out by presupposing a debt-money system? 
 
Given the lack of truly valid factual or implicative criticism of the MGI, we wondered in our 
paper whether the criticisms that do exist might have arisen, in part, from the fact that an MGI 
does not sit well within the conceptual frameworks that some economists prefer when they 
consider possibilities for steady-state or degrowth policies. We also noted that economists, 
like any professional, have assumptions about how they might be regarded for their 
conclusions, which could lead them to avoid findings that are seemingly problematic to apply 
in our society. Given the risk of disruption to economies and governments from the huge levels 
of debt from Covid-19 responses and the increasing disruption and risk of societal breakdown 
from the ecological and climate crisis, we conclude that far bolder and transdisciplinary work 
is needed on economics in general, and monetary systems in particular. If efforts to address 
 
23  See https://communityshares.org.uk  
24  See http://moneyrebellion.earth 
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global dilemmas like pandemics and climate chaos do not include monetary adaptation, these 
efforts should not be considered sufficient to meet the depth, scale and urgency of our shared 
planetary predicament.  
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